Theorizing Masculinities

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Gender Displays and Men’s Power
The “New Man” and the Mexican Immigrant Man

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In our discussions about masculinity with our students (most of whom are white and upper-middle class), talk invariably turns to critical descriptions of the “macho” behavior of “traditional men.” Consistently, these men are portrayed as “out there,” not in the classroom with us. Although it usually remains an unspoken subtext, at times a student will actually speak it: Those men who are still stuck in “traditional, sexist, and macho” styles of masculinity are black men, Latino men, immigrant men, and working-class men. They are not us; we are the New Men, the Modern, Educated, and Enlightened Men. The belief that poor, working-class, and ethnic minority men are stuck in an atavistic, sexist “traditional male role,” while white, educated middle-class men are forging a more sensitive egalitarian “New,” or “Modern male role,” is not uncommon. Social scientific theory and research on men and masculinity, as well as the “men’s movement,” too often collude with this belief by defining masculinity almost entirely in terms of gender display (i.e., styles of talk, dress, and bodily comportment), while ignoring men’s structural positions of power and privilege over women and the subordination of certain groups of men to other men (Broda, 1983-1984). Our task in this chapter is to explore and explicate some links between contemporary men’s gender displays and men’s various positions in a social structure of power. Scott Coltrane’s (1992) comparative analysis of gender display and power in 93 nonindustrial societies provides us with an important starting point. Coltrane found that men’s “fierce public displays and denigration of women ... competitive physical contests, vociferous oratory, ceremonies related to warfare, exclusive men’s houses and rituals, and sexual violence against women” are common features in societies where men control property and have distant relations with young children (Coltrane, 1992, p. 87). By contrast, “in societies in which women exercise significant control over property and men have close relationships with children, men infrequently affirm their manliness through boastful demonstrations of strength, aggressiveness, and sexual potency” (p. 86). This research suggests that men’s public gender displays are not grounded in some essential “need” for men to dominate others but, instead, tend to vary according to the extent of power and privilege that men hold vis-à-vis women. Put another way, the micropolitics of men’s and women’s daily gender displays and interactions both reflect and reconstruct the macropolitical relations between the sexes (Henley, 1977).

But in modern industrial societies, the politics of gender are far more complex than in nonindustrial societies. Some men publicly display verbal and physical aggression, misogyny, and violence. There are public institutions such as the military, the fraternities, and the street where these forms of gender display are valorized (Connell, 1991a, 1992b; Lyman, 1987; Martin & Hummer, 1989; Messner, 1992; Sabo, 1985). Other men, though, display more “softness” and “sensitivity,” and this form of gender display has been recently lauded as an emergent “New Masculinity.”

In this chapter, we will contrast the gender display and structural positions of power (in both public and domestic spheres of life) of two groups of men: class-privileged white men and Mexican immigrant men. We will argue that utilizing the concepts of Modern (or New) and Traditional men to describe these two groups oversimplifies a complex reality, smudges in racist and classist biases about Mexican immigrant men, and obscures the real class, race, and gender privileges that New Men still enjoy. We will argue that the theoretical concepts of hegemonic, marginalized, and subordinated masculinities best capture the dynamic and shifting constellation of contemporary men’s gender displays and power (Broda, 1987; Connell, 1987; Kaufman, 1987; Segal, 1990). We will conclude by arguing that a critical/feminist sociology of men and masculinity should decentre and problematize hegemonic masculinity by proceeding from the standpoint of marginalized and subordinated masculinities.

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The "New Man" as Ideological Class Icon

Today there is a shared cultural image of what the New Man looks like: He is a white, college-educated professional who is a highly involved and nurturant father, "in touch with" and expressive of his feelings, and egalitarian in his dealings with women. We will briefly examine two fragments of the emergent cultural image of the contemporary New Man; the participant in the mythopoetic men's movement and the New Father. We will discuss these contemporary images of men both in terms of their larger cultural meanings and in terms of the extent to which they represent any real shift in the ways men live their lives vis-à-vis women and other men. Most important, we will ask if apparent shifts in the gender displays of some white, middle-class men represent any real transformations in their structural positions of power and privilege.

Zeus Power and the Mythopoetic Men's Movement

A recently emergent fragment of the cultural image of the New Man is the man who attends the weekend "gatherings of men" that are at the heart of Robert Bly's mythopoetic men's movement. Bly's curious interpretations of mythology and his highly selective use of history, psychology, and anthropology have been soundly criticized as "bad social science" (e.g., Connell, 1992a; Kimmel, 1992; Pelka, 1991). But perhaps more important than a critique of Bly's ideas is a sociological interpretation of why the mythopoetic men's movement has been so attractive to so many predominantly white, college-educated, middle-class, middle-aged men in the United States over the past decade. (Thousands of men have attended Bly's gatherings, and his book was a national best-seller.) We speculate that Bly's movement attracts these men not because it represents any sort of radical break from "traditional masculinity" but precisely because it is so congruent with shifts that are already taking place within current constructions of hegemonic masculinity. Many of the men who attend Bly's gatherings are already aware of some of the problems and limits of narrow conceptions of masculinity. A major preoccupation of the gatherings is the poverty of these men's relationships with their fathers and with other men in workplaces. These concerns are based on very real and often very painful experiences. Indeed, industrial capitalism undermined much of the structural basis of middle-class men's emotional bonds with each other as wage labor, market competition, and instrumental rationality largely supplanted primogeniture, craft brotherhood, and inter-generational mentorhood (Clawson, 1989; Tolson, 1977). Bly's "male initiation" rituals are intended to heal and reconstruct these masculine bonds, and they are thus, at least on the surface, probably experienced as largely irrelevant to men's relationships with women.

But in focusing on how myth and ritual can reconnect men with each other and ultimately with their own "deep masculine" essences, Bly manages to sidestep the central point of the feminist critique—that men, as a group, benefit from a structure of power that oppresses women as a group. In ignoring the social structure of power, Bly manages to convey a false symmetry between the feminist women's movement and his men's movement. He assumes a natural dichotomization of "male values" and "female values" and states that feminism has been good for women in allowing them to reassert "the feminine voice" that had been suppressed. But Bly states (and he carefully avoids directly blaming feminism for this), "the masculine voice" has now been muted—men have become "passive . . . tamed . . . domesticated." Men thus need a movement to reconnect with the "Zeus energy" that they have lost. "Zeus energy is male authority accepted for the good of the community" (Bly, 1990, p. 61).

The notion that men need to be empowered as men echoes the naïveté of some 1970s men's liberation activists who saw men and women as "equally oppressed" by sexism (e.g., Farrell, 1975). The view that everyone is oppressed by sexism strips the concept of oppression of its political meaning and thus obscures the social relations of domination and subordination. Oppression is a concept that describes a relationship between social groups; for one group to be oppressed, there must be an oppressor group (Freire, 1970). This is not to imply that an oppressive relationship between groups is absolute or static. To the contrary, oppression is characterized by a constant and complex state of play: Oppressed groups both actively participate in their own domination and actively resist that domination. The state of play of the contemporary gender order is characterized by men's individual and collective oppression of women (Connell, 1987). Men continue to benefit from this oppression of women, but, significantly, in the past 20 years, women's compliance with masculine hegemony has been counterbalanced by active feminist resistance.

Men do tend to pay a price for their power: They are often emotionally limited and commonly suffer poor health and a life expectancy lower than that of women. But these problems are best viewed not as "gender oppression," but rather as the "costs of being on top" (Kann, 1986). In fact,
the shifts in masculine styles that we see among some relatively privileged men may be interpreted as a sign that these men would like to stop paying these costs, but it does not necessarily signal a desire to cease being “on top.” For example, it has become commonplace to see powerful and successful men weeping in public—Ronald Reagan shedding a tear at the funeral of slain U.S. soldiers, basketball player Michael Jordan openly crying after winning the NBA championship. Most recent, the easy manner in which the media lauded U.S. General Schwartzkopf as a New Man for shedding a public tear for the U.S. casualties in the Gulf War is indicative of the importance placed on styles of masculine gender display rather than the institutional position of power that men such as Schwartzkopf still enjoy.

This emphasis on the significance of public displays of crying indicates, in part, a naïve belief that if boys and men can learn to “express their feelings,” they will no longer feel a need to dominate others. In fact, there is no necessary link between men’s “emotional inexpressivity” and their tendency to dominate others (Sattel, 1976). The idea that men’s “need” to dominate others is the result of an emotional deficit overly psychologizes a reality that is largely structural. It does seem that the specific type of masculinity that was ascendant (hegemonic) during the rise of entrepreneurial capitalism was extremely instrumental, stoic, and emotionally inexpressive (Winter & Robert, 1980). But there is growing evidence (e.g., Schwartzkopf) that today there is no longer a neat link between class-privileged men’s emotional inexpressivity and their willingness and ability to dominate others (Connell, 1991b). We speculate that a situational appropriateness public display of sensitivity such as crying, rather than signaling weakness, has instead become a legitimizing sign of the New Man’s power.

Thus relatively privileged men may be attracted to the mythopoetic men’s movement because, on the one hand, it acknowledges and validates their painful “wounds,” while guiding them to connect with other men in ways that are both nurturing and mutually empowering. On the other hand, and unlike feminism, it does not confront men with the reality of how their own privileges are based on the continued subordination of women and other men. In short, the mythopoetic men’s movement may be seen as facilitating the reconstruction of a new form of hegemonic masculinity—a masculinity that is less self-destructive, that has revalued and reconstructed men’s emotional bonds with each other, and that has learned to feel good about its own Zeus power.

The New Father

In recent years Western culture has been bombarded with another fragment of the popular image of the New Man: the involved, nurturant father. Research has indicated that many young heterosexual men do appear to be more inclined than were their fathers to “help out” with housework and child care, but most of them still see these tasks as belonging to their wives or their future wives (Machung, 1989; Sijel, 1990). Despite the cultural image of the “new fatherhood” and some modest increases in participation by men, the vast majority of child care, especially of infants, is still performed by women (Hochschild, 1989; La Rossa, 1988; Lewis, 1986; Russell, 1983).

Why does men’s stated desire to participate in parenting so rarely translate into substantially increased involvement? Lynn Segal (1990) argues that the fact that men’s apparent attitudinal changes have not translated into widespread behavioral changes may be largely due to the fact men that may (correctly) fear that increased parental involvement will translate into a loss of their power over women. But she also argues that increased paternal involvement in child care will not become a widespread reality unless and until the structural preconditions—especially economic equality for women—exist. Indeed, Rosanna Hertz (1986) found in her study of upper-middle-class “dual career families” that a more egalitarian division of family labor sometimes developed as a rational (and constantly negotiated) response to a need to maintain his career, her career, and the family. In other words, career and pay equality for women was a structural precondition for the development of equality between husbands and wives in the family.

However, Hertz notes two reasons why this is a very limited and flawed equality. First, Hertz’s sample of dual-career families in which the women and the men made roughly the same amount of money is still extremely atypical. In two-income families, the husband is far more likely to have the higher income. Women are far more likely than men to work part-time jobs, and among full-time workers, women still earn about 65 cents to the male dollar and are commonly segregated in lower paid, lower status, dead-end jobs (Blum, 1991; Reskin & Roos, 1990). As a result, most women are not in the structural position to be able to bargain with their husbands for more egalitarian divisions of labor in the home. As Hochschild’s (1989) research demonstrates, middle-class women’s struggles for equity in the home are often met by their husbands’ “quiet
structure of power in society, these changes do not appear to challenge or undermine this power. To the contrary, the cultural image of the New Man and the partial and fragmentary empirical changes that this image represents serve to file off some of the rough edges of hegemonic masculinity in such a way that the possibility of a happier and healthier life for men is created, while deflecting or resisting feminist challenges to men's institutional power and privilege. But because at least verbal acceptance of the "New Woman" is an important aspect of this reconstructed hegemonic masculinity, the ideological image of the New Man requires a counterimage against which to stand in opposition. Those aspects of traditional hegemonic masculinity that the New Man has rejected—overt physical and verbal displays of domination, stoicism and emotional inexpressiveness, overt misogyny in the workplace and at home—are now increasingly projected onto less privileged groups of men: working-class men, gay body-builders, black athletes, Latinos, and immigrant men.

**Mexican Immigrant Men**

According to the dominant cultural stereotype, Latino men's "machismo" is supposedly characterized by extreme verbal and bodily expressions of aggression toward other men, frequent drunkenness, and sexual aggression and dominance expressed toward normally "submissive" Latinas. Manuel Peña's (1991) research on the workplace culture of male undocumented Mexican immigrant agricultural workers suggests that there is a great deal of truth to this stereotype. Peña examined the Mexican immigrant male's participation in charritas coloradas (red jokes) that characterize the basis of the workplace culture. The most common basis of humor in the charritas is sexualized "sadism toward women and symbolic threats of sodomy toward other males" (Paredes, 1966, p. 121).

On the surface, Peña argues, the constant "half-serious, half playful duels" among the men, as well as the images of sexually debased "perverted wenches" and "treacherous women" in the charritas, appear to support the stereotype of the Mexican immigrant male group as being characterized by a high level of aggressive masculine posturing and shared antigonyms and hatred directed toward women. But rather than signifying a fundamental hatred of women, Peña argues that these men's public displays of machismo should be viewed as a defensive reaction to their oppressed class status:
As an expression of working-class culture, the folklore of machismo can be considered a realized signifying system [that] points to, but simultaneously displaces, a class relationship and its attendant conflict. At the same time, it introduces a third element, the gender relationship, which acts as a mediator between the signifier (the folklore) and the signified (the class relationship). (Peña, 1991, p. 40)

Undocumented Mexican immigrant men are unable to directly confront their class oppressors, so instead, Peña argues, they symbolically displace their class antagonism into the arena of gender relations. Similar arguments have been made about other groups of men. For instance, David Collinson (1988) argues that Australian male blue-collar workers commonly engage in sexually aggressive and misogynist humor, as an ultimately flawed means of bonding together to resist the control of management males (who are viewed, disparagingly, as feminized). Majors and Billson (1992) argue that young black males tend to embody and publicly display a “cool pose,” an expressive and often sexually aggressive style of masculinity that acts as a form of resistance to racism. These studies make important strides toward building an understanding of how subordinate and marginalized groups of men tend to embody and publicly display styles of masculinity that at least symbolically resist the various forms of oppression that they face within hierarchies of internale dominance. These studies all share the insight that the public faces of subordinate groups of men are personally and collectively constructed performances of masculine gender display. By contrast, the public face of the New Man (his “sensitivity,” etc.) is often assumed to be one-and-the-same with who he “is,” rather than being seen as a situationally constructed public gender display.

Yet in foregrounding the oppression of men by men, these studies risk portraying aggressive, even misogynist, gender displays primarily as liberatory forms of resistance against class and racial oppression (e.g., Mirandé, 1982). Though these studies view microlevel gender display as constructed within a context of structured power relations, macrolevel gender relations are rarely viewed as a constituting dynamic within this structure. Rather gender is commonly viewed as an epiphenomenon, an effect of the dominant class and/or race relations. What is obscured, or even drops out of sight, is the feminist observation that masculinity itself is a form of domination over women. As a result, women’s actual experiences of oppression and victimization by men’s violence are conspicuously absent from these analyses, thus leaving the impression that misogyny is merely a symbolic displacement of class (or race) antagonism. What is needed, then, is an examination of masculine gender display and power within the context of intersecting systems of class, race, and gender relations (Baca Zinn, Cannon, Higgenbotham, & Dill, 1986; Collins, 1990). In the following section we will consider recent ethnographic research on Mexican immigrant communities that suggests that gender dynamics help to constitute the immigration process and, in turn, are reconstituted during and following the immigrant settlement process.

The Rhetoric of Return Migration as Gender Display

Mexican immigrant men who have lived in the United States for long periods of time frequently engage in the rhetoric of return migration. These stated preferences are not necessarily indicative of what they will do, but they provide some telling clues to these men’s feelings and perceptions about their lives as marginalized men in the United States. Consider the following statements:

I’ve passed more of my life here than in Mexico. I’ve been here for thirty-one years. I’m not putting down or rejecting this country, but my intentions have always been to return to Mexico . . . I’d like to retire there, perhaps open a little business. Maybe I could buy and sell animals, or open a restaurant. Here I work for a big company, like a slave, always watching the clock. Well I’m bored with that.

I don’t want to stay in the U.S. anymore. [Why not?] Because here I can no longer find a good job. Here, even if one is sick, you must report for work. They don’t care. I’m fed up with it. I’m tired of working here too. Here one must work daily, and over there with my mother, I’ll work for four, maybe five months, and then I’ll have a four or five month break without working. My mother is old and I want to be with the family. I need to take care of the rancho. Here I have nothing. I don’t have my own house, I even share the rent! What am I doing here?

I would like to return, but as my sons are born here, well that is what detain me here. Otherwise, I would go back to Mexico . . . Mexico is now in a very inflationary situation. People come here not because they like it, but because the situation causes them to do so, and it makes them stay here for years and years. As the song says, this is a cage made of gold, but it is still a cage.

These statements point to disappointments with migration. In recent years, U.S.-bound migration has become institutionalized in many areas of Mexico, representing a rite of passage for many young, single men
(Davis, 1990; Escobar, Gonzalez de la Rocha, & Roberts, 1987). But once in the United States the accomplishment of masculinity and maturity hinges on living up to the image of a financially successful migrant. If a man returns home penniless, he risks being seen as a failure or a fool. As one man explained: “One cannot go back without anything, because people will talk. They’ll say ‘oh look at this guy, he sacrificed and suffered to go north and he has nothing to show for it.’”

Although most of these men enjoyed a higher standard of living in the United States than in Mexico, working and settling in the United States significantly diminished their patriarchal privileges. Although the men compensated by verbally demonstrating their lack of commitment to staying in the United States, most of these men realized that their lives remained firmly anchored in the United States and that they lacked the ability to return. They could not acquire sufficient savings in the public sphere to fund return migration, and in the domestic sphere, they did not command enough authority over their wives or children, who generally wished to remain in the United States, to coerce the return migration of their families. Although Mexican immigrant men blamed the terms of U.S. production as their reason for wanting to return to Mexico, we believe that their diminished patriarchal privileges significantly fueled this desire to return. Here, we examine the diminution of patriarchy in three arenas: spatial mobility, authority in family decision-making processes, and household labor.

Mexican immigrant men, especially those who were undocumented and lacked legal status privileges, experienced limited spatial mobility in their daily lives and this compromised their sense of masculinity (Rouse, 1990). As undocumented immigrants, these men remained fearful of apprehension by the Immigration Naturalization Service and by the police. In informal conversations, the men often shared experiences with police harassment and racial discrimination. Merely “looking Mexican,” the men agreed, was often cause for suspicion. The jobs Mexican immigrant men commonly took also restricted their spatial mobility. As poor men who worked long hours at jobs as gardeners, dishwashers, or day laborers, they had very little discretionary income to afford leisure activities. As one man offered, “Here my life is just from work to the home, from work to the home.”

Although the men, together with their families, visited parks, shops, and church, the public spaces open to the men alone were typically limited to street corners and a few neighborhood bars, pool halls, and doughnut shops. As Rouse (1990) has argued, Mexican immigrant men, especially those from rural areas, resent these constrictions on their public space and mobility and attempt to reproduce public spaces that they knew in Mexico in the context of U.S. bars and pool halls. In a California immigrant community Rouse observed that “men do not come to drink alone or to meet with a couple of friends . . . they move from table to table, broadening the circuits of information in which they participate and modulating social relationships across the widest possible range.” Although these men tried to create new spaces where they might recapture a public sense of self, the goal was not so readily achieved. For many men, the loss of free and easy mobility signified their loss of publicly accorded status and recognition. One man, a junkyard assembler who had worked in Mexico as a rural campesino (peasant), recalled that in his Mexican village he enjoyed a modicum of public recognition: “I would enter the bars, the dances, and when I entered everyone would stand to shake my hand as though I were somebody—not a rich man, true, but I was famous. Wherever you like, I was always mentioned. Wherever you like, everyone knew me back there.” In metropolitan areas of California, anonymity replaced public status and recognition.

In Mexico many of these men had acted as the undisputed patriarchs in major family decision-making processes, but in the United States they no longer retained their monopoly on these processes. When families were faced with major decisions—such as whom to seek for legal help, whether or not to move to another town, or the decision to lend money or make a major purchase—spousal negotiation replaced patriarchal exertions of authority. These processes did not go uncontested, and some of the decision-making discussions were more conflictual than harmonious, but collaboration, not domination, characterized them.

This trend toward more egalitarian patterns of shared authority often began with migration. In some families, men initially migrated north alone, and during their absences, the women acted decisively and autonomously as they performed a range of tasks necessary to secure family sustenance. Commentators have referred to this situation as one in which “thousands of wives in the absence of their husbands must ‘take the reigns’” (Mummert, 1988, p. 283) and as one in which the wives of veteran migrants experience “a freedom where woman command” (una libertad donde mujeres mandan) (Baca & Bryan, 1985). This trend toward more shared decision making continued after the women’s migration and was also promoted by migration experiences as well as the relative increase in women’s and the decrease in men’s economic contributions to the family (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 1992). As the balance of relative resources
and contributions shifted, the women assumed more active roles in key decision-making processes. Similar shifts occurred with the older children, who were now often reluctant to subordinate their earnings and their autonomy to a patriarchal family hierarchy. As one man somewhat reluctantly, but resignedly, acknowledged: “Well, each person orders one’s self here, something like that . . . Back there [Mexico], no. It was still whatever I said. I decided matters.”

The household division of labor is another arena that in some cases reflected the renegotiation of patriarchal relations. Although most families continued to organize their daily household chores along fairly orthodox, patriarchal norms, in some families—notably those where the men had lived for many years in “bachelor communities” where they learned to cook, iron, and make tortillas—men took responsibility for some of the housework. In these cases, men did part of the cooking and housework, they unself-consciously assumed the role of host in offering guests food and beverages, and in some instances, the men continued to make tortillas on weekends and special occasions. These changes, of course, are modest if judged by ideal standards of feminist egalitarianism, but they are significant when compared to patriarchal family organization that was normative before immigration.

This movement toward more egalitarian divisions of labor in some Mexican immigrant households cannot be fully explained by the men’s acquisition of household skills in bachelor communities. (We are reminded, for instance, of several middle-class male friends of ours who lived in “bachelor” apartments during college, and after later marrying, conveniently “forgot” how to cook, wash clothes, and do other household chores.) The acquisition of skills appears to be a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for men’s greater household labor participation in reunited families.

A key to the movement toward greater equality within immigrant families was the change in the women’s and men’s relative positions of power and status in the larger social structure of power. Mexican immigrant men’s public status in the United States is very low, due to racism, insecure and low-paying jobs, and (often) illegal status. For those families that underwent long periods of spousal separation, women often engaged in formal- or informal-sector paid labor for the first time, developed more economic skills and autonomy, and assumed control over household affairs. In the United States nearly all of the women sought employment, so women made significant economic contributions to the family. All of these factors tend to erode men’s patriarchal authority in the family and empower women to either directly challenge that authority or at least renegotiate “patriarchal bargains” (Kandiyoti, 1988) that are more palatable to themselves and their children.

Although it is too hasty to proclaim that gender egalitarianism prevails in interpersonal relations among undocumented Mexican immigrants, there is a significant trend in that direction. This is indicated by the emergence of a more egalitarian household division of labor, by shared decision-making processes, and by the constraints on men’s and expansion of women’s spatial mobility. Women still have less power than men, but they generally enjoy more than they previously did in Mexico. The stereotypical image of dominant macho males and submissive females in Mexican immigrant families is thus contradicted by actual research with these families.

### Masculine Displays and Relative Power

We have suggested that men’s overt public displays of masculine bravado, interpersonal dominance, misogyny, embodied strength, and so forth are often a sign of a lack of institutional power and privilege, vis-à-vis other men. Though it would be a mistake to conclude that Mexican immigrant men are not misogynist (or, following Peña, that their misogyny is merely a response to class oppression), there is considerable evidence that their actual relations with women in families—at least when measured by family divisions of labor and decision-making processes—are becoming more egalitarian than they were in Mexico. We have also argued that for more privileged men, public displays of sensitivity might be read as signs of class/race/gender privilege and power over women and (especially) over other men (see Table 11.1 for a summary comparison of these two groups).

Coltrane (1992) argues that in nonindustrial societies, “men’s displays of dominance confirm and reinforce existing property relations rather than compensate for a lack of control over valued resources” (pp. 102-103). His claim that men’s control (rather than lack of control) of resources is correlated with more extreme microdisplays of masculinity seems, at first, to contradict findings by Peña, Collinson, and Billson and Majors, who claim that in industrial societies, lack of access to property and other material resources by Mexican immigrant, working-class, and black males.
Table 11.1 Comparison of Public and Domestic Gender Displays of White, Class-Privileged Men and Mexican Immigrant Men

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<th>Public</th>
<th>Domestic</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Power/Status</td>
<td>Gender Display</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>White, class-privileged men</strong></td>
<td>High, built into position</td>
<td>“Sensitive,” little overt misogyny</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Mexican immigrant men</strong></td>
<td>Low (job status, pay, control of work, legal rights, public status)</td>
<td>“Hombre”: verbal misogyny, embodied toughness in work/ peer culture</td>
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are correlated with more overt outward displays of aggressive, misogynist masculinity. The key to understanding this apparent contradiction is that Coltrane is discussing societies where women enjoy high social status, where men are highly involved in child care, and where women have a great deal of control over property and other material resources. In these types of societies, men do not “need” to display dominance and masculine bravado. But in complex, stratified societies where the standards of hegemonic masculinity are that a man should control resources (and other people), men who do not have access to these standards of masculinity thus tend to react with displays of toughness, bravado, “cool pose,” or “hombre” (Baca Zinn, 1982). Marginalized and subordinated men, then, tend to overtly display exaggerated embodiments and verbalizations of masculinity that can be read as a desire to express power over others within a context of relative powerlessness. By contrast, many of the contemporary New Man’s highly celebrated public displays of sensitivity can be read as a desire to project an image of egalitarianism within a context where he actually enjoys considerable power and privilege over women and other men. Both groups of men are “displaying gender,” but the specific forms that their masculine displays take tend to vary according to their relative positions in (a) the social structure of men’s overall power relationships to women and (b) the social structure of some men’s power relationships with other men.

**Conclusion**

We have argued for the importance of viewing microlevel gender displays of different groups of men within the context of their positions in a larger social structure of power. Too often critical discussions of masculinity tend to project atavistic hypermasculine, aggressive, misogynist masculinity onto relatively powerless men. By comparison, the masculine gender displays of educated, privileged New Men are too often uncritically applauded, rather than skeptically and critically examined. We have suggested that when analyzed within a structure of power, the gender displays of the New Man might best be seen as strategies to reconstruct hegemonic masculinity by projecting aggression, dominance, and misogyny onto subordinate groups of men. Does this mean that all of men’s changes today are merely symbolic and ultimately do not contribute to the types of changes in gender relations that feminists have called for? It may appear so, especially if social scientists continue to collude with this reality by theoretically framing shifts in styles of hegemonic masculinity as indicative of the arrival of a New Man, while framing marginalized men as Other—as atavistic, traditional men. Instead, a critical/feminist analysis of changing masculinities in the United States might begin with a focus on the ways that marginalized and subordinated masculinities are changing.

This shift in focus would likely accomplish three things: First, it would remove hegemonic masculinity from center stage, thus taking the standpoint of oppressed groups of men as central points of departure. Second, it would require the deployment of theoretical frameworks that examine the ways that the politics of social class, race, ethnicity, and sexuality interact with those of gender (Baca Zinn, Cannon, Higgenbotham, & Dill, 1986; Collins, 1990; Harding, 1986; Honigman-Soto, 1992; Messner, 1990). Third, a sociology of masculinities that starts from the experience of marginalized and subordinated men would be far more likely to have power and politics—rather than personal styles or lifestyles—at its center. This is because men of color, poor and working-class men, immigrant men, and gay men are often in very contradictory positions at the nexus of intersecting systems of domination and subordination. In short, although they are oppressed by class, race, and/or sexual systems of power, they also commonly construct and display forms of masculinity as ways of resisting other men’s power over them, as well as asserting power and privilege over women. Thus, to avoid reverting to the tendency to view masculinity simply as a defensive reaction to other forms of oppression,
it is crucial in such studies to keep women’s experience of gender oppression as close to the center of analysis as possible. This sort of analysis might inform the type of progressive coalition building that is necessary if today’s changing masculinities are to contribute to the building of a more egalitarian and democratic world.

Notes

1. This section of the chapter is adapted from Messner (1993).

2. It is significant we suspect, that the examples cited of Reagan, Jordan, and Schwartzkopf publicly weeping occurred at moments of victory over other men in war and sport.

3. Our speculation on the class and racial bias of the mythopoetic men’s movement and on the appeal of the movement to participants is supported, in part, by ongoing (but as yet unpublished) research by sociologist Michael Schwalbe. Schwalbe observes that the "wounds" of these men are very real, because a very high proportion of them are children of alcoholic parents and/or were victims of childhood sexual abuse or other forms of violence. Many are involved in recovery programs.


5. For a similar finding and analysis in the context of Dominican immigrants in New York City, see Pessar (1986).

6. This constraint was exacerbated by passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, which imposed employer sanctions and doubly criminalized undocumented immigrants’. presence at the workplace.

References


12
Postmodernism and the Interrogation of Masculinity

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The form is fluid, but the meaning even more so.
Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, Second Essay, Section 12

Shifting Subjects, Indeterminate Identities, Ascribing Agency

Over the last hundred years, the Enlightenment concept of the transcendent subject (existing before and beyond the social realm) has been critiqued by theorists who maintain that subjects are culturally constituted. This shift has roots in Nietzsche's (1967) pronouncement in On the Genealogy of Morals that “there is no ‘being’ behind doing, effecting, becoming; ‘the doer’ is merely a fiction added to the deed—the deed is everything” (p. 45). This “deed” that constitutes individuals is often seen as social forces—from one's relation to the mode of production (in the Marxist tradition) to the public discourses that produce social systems of value (a perspective most often associated with postmodernism). Michel Foucault, a leading proponent of this latter direction of analysis, instructs that systems of power in a given society produce social subjects discursively.1 “The individual,” Foucault (1980b) writes, “is an effect of power” (p. 98).